Abstract
Introduction

27
What does it mean when someone says they are undecided about how to vote just weeks of voters in swing states were undecided, and another 17% said they might change their minds 32 [1] . These percentages are more than enough to decide most elections, making the prediction of 33 undecided voters' behavior an important problem for pollsters and social scientists. Is it possible 34 to predict the behavior of individuals who cannot predict their own?
35
Psychologists have recently suggested an innovative solution to this problem. Galdi, 36 Arcuri, and Gawronski [2] proposed that a key to predicting the behavior of undecided voters lies an issue. Implicit evaluations come to mind whether or not they are endorsed as true. They may the extent that people use this biased set of information in making a deliberate decision, implicit 48 attitudes may predict eventual decisions even though respondents are undecided when the implicit attitudes are measured. Evidence for this hypothesis was reported by Galdi, Gawronski, 50 Arcuri, and Friese [3] , who demonstrated that the implicit attitudes of undecided participants 51 predicted selective exposure to information consistent with their implicit attitudes. Individuals 52 who describe themselves as undecided may therefore have implicit attitudes that will ultimately 53 lead to conscious preferences, but have not yet done so (see also [4] ).
54
There is additional reason to believe that implicit attitudes may predict behavior for 55 undecided voters: Being "decided" or "undecided" is a meta-cognitive judgment that people 56 make about their own decision processes. Models of explicit and implicit attitudes suggest that 57 people are more likely to consider their explicit attitudes to be a valid basis for judgment [5, 6] .
58
Whereas explicit attitudes are experienced as conscious preferences or "considered opinions," 59 implicit attitudes tend to be experienced as "gut feelings" [5, 7] . 60 We suggest that, when people indicate whether they have decided, they are more likely to 61 base this judgment on their consciously endorsed (i.e., explicit) attitudes than on implicit 62 attitudes. If explicit attitudes strongly favor one option over the other, then the respondent will 63 claim to be decided, whereas if the explicit attitude is weak, unclear, or ambivalent, then the 64 respondent will claim to be undecided. Based on this reasoning, explicit attitudes should be more 65 predictive of behavior among decided voters than undecided voters. Introspection, however, may 66 overlook implicit attitudes. When people introspect about whether they have decided, they may 67 focus on consciously endorsed attitudes and neglect implicit attitudes as though they were 68 invisible. Implicit attitudes would nonetheless be automatically activated and would still have the 69 potential to influence behavior. Based on this introspective invisibility hypothesis, implicit 70 attitudes should be equally predictive of behavior among the decided and the undecided. explicit and implicit attitudes were predictive of voting for both decided and undecided voters.
123
Taken together, two out of the three critical analyses in Friese et al. [9] suggest that 124 explicit attitudes may be more predictive for decided than undecided voters. Implicit attitudes 125 were equally predictive for decided and undecided voters in all three analyses, but the effects of 126 implicit attitudes were small in all analyses and non-significant in one. It was these small effects 
The Present Research
130
In this study we re-examine the roles of implicit and explicit attitudes in predicting voting 131 behavior among decided and undecided voters. Like Friese and colleagues [9] , we studied actual 
153
Although the IAT and the AMP are both well validated implicit measures, past research has 154 generally found the two measures to be only weakly correlated [12, 13] . This may be, first,
155
because the AMP measures affective responses to the stimuli presented as primes whereas the 156 IAT is more likely to measure associations to the category labels. Second, the mechanism driving 157 the AMP is assumed to be a misattribution of affect from the prime to the target, whereas the 158 mechanism driving the IAT is assumed to be response interference. A third difference is that the 159 measure of interest in the AMP is an evaluation whereas in the IAT it is response times. Thus, 160 the two measures are likely to differ for both psychological and technical reasons.
161
Additionally, the previous studies we reviewed measured decidedness with a binary 162 measure in which respondents classified themselves as decided or undecided [2, 8, 9] . Our study 
Respondents and Sampling
181
In all analyses described, we used data from the American National Election Studies Organizations, and all participants provided informed consent prior to participation.
199
Additionally, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Non-Biomedical IRB determined 200 this research to be exempt from review for human subjects research (#08-0805). for Mr. Obama, such that higher scores indicate a greater explicit preference for Mr. Obama.
224
Explicit attitude measures were collected during the same survey wave as the implicit attitude 225 measure.
226
Confidence regarding one's voting intention. To assess whether respondents had 227 decided about their vote, respondents were first asked for whom they thought they would vote in 228 the election for president. After answering, they were then asked: "How sure are you of that?"
229
Responses were made on a 5-point scale from "extremely sure" to "not sure at all." We scored third-party candidate) were not included in our analyses.
237
Results
238
Of those respondents who completed all measures of interest (N = 2,013), 52.5% 239 indicated a vote for Mr. Obama (47.5% for Mr. McCain). Additionally, 60.2% indicated that they 240 were "extremely sure," 18.2% that they were "very sure," 14.4% that they were "moderately 241 sure," 4.1% that they were "slightly sure," and 3.1% that they were "not sure at all."
242
For all analyses, continuous variables were standardized using z-scores prior to analysis. Table 1 were more confident about how they would vote.
254
Decisions among the Undecided 13 The second model in Table 1 [9] finding that, when modeled separately, both explicit and implicit attitudes were 260 more predictive of voting behavior for decided than for undecided voters.
261
The results thus far examined explicit and implicit attitudes separately. However, explicit 262 and implicit candidate preferences were highly correlated (r = .688, p < .001). As noted Table 1 shows that explicit (B = 3.718, SE = .473, p < .001) and implicit (B = 2.179, SE 266 = .351, p < .001) candidate preferences each uniquely predicted voting.
267
Critically, the interaction between implicit candidate preference and confidence became illustrate the nature of these relationships between attitudes and confidence, we calculated the
As one reviewer noted, the explicit measure of candidate preference used in this analysis is based on only two items and, therefore, may not offer a strong standard of comparison for the incremental validity of an implicit measure. Further, in Friese et al.'s [9] Study 2, when additional explicit indicators of voting attitudes were included, all previously significant effects for implicit measures became nonsignificant. Thus, in order to conduct a more conservative test, we repeated the analyses with the inclusion of two additional explicit indicators: political party affiliation and political ideology. Though both new covariates were significant predictors of voting behavior (ps < .001), the same pattern of results still emerged. Both explicit and implicit candidate preference were significant predictors of voting behavior (ps < .0001), and explicit preference was moderated by confidence (p < .005), while implicit preference was not (p = .51).
Decisions among the Undecided 14 simple slopes (displayed in Figure 1 ) relating implicit and explicit candidate preference to voting 274 probabilities separately for respondents at each of the five levels of confidence. As confidence 275 decreased, the predictive validity of explicit attitudes fell sharply, but the change for implicit 276 attitudes was slight and non-significant.
277
To further examine the significant interaction between explicit attitudes and confidence,
278
we tested the significance and effect size of those simple slopes (reported in Table 2 ). For voters 279 at the four highest levels of confidence, explicit attitudes were a significant predictor of voting. The same ANES data used for the candidate attitudes were also used for the examination 295 of racial attitudes. In the analyses that follow, measures of voting behavior and confidence in the 18.3% that they were "very sure," 13.0% that they were "moderately sure," 4.1% that they were 323 "slightly sure," and 3.5% that they were "not sure at all."
324
Explicit and implicit racial attitudes were modestly correlated (r = .282, p < .001),
325
consistent with prior research [15, 17] . explicit measures were only modestly correlated, making the shared variance less problematic.
340
The next analysis examined the consequences of controlling for explicit attitudes. term for explicit attitudes was significantly greater than that for implicit attitudes.
387
Racial Attitudes
388
We conducted a parallel analysis for racial attitudes (see Figure 3, confidence, then implicit attitudes should predict behavior even among undecided voters.
405
General Discussion
406
The idea that implicit attitude measures can predict the behavior of undecided voters has 407 generated a great deal of interest, because it suggests that precursors of decisions can be detected 
422
We also explored the hypothesis that implicit attitudes might predict behavior even 423 among the undecided because, when people introspect, they attend to consciously endorsed 424 attitudes and neglect implicit attitudes. Consistent with this idea, we found that more extreme 425 explicit attitudes were associated with greater confidence. The relationship between attitudes 426 extremity and confidence was much weaker for implicit attitudes. We also found that this effect 427 was much larger for candidate attitudes than racial attitudes. This difference may result because,
428
when people assess their confidence in their vote, they are most likely to introspect about their 429 feelings toward the candidates. However, the fact that a similar (albeit weaker) tendency was account and the biased processing account.
440
Relationship to Past Research
441
A close look at the results of Friese et al. [9] shows that, in the three analyses in which quite similar. The main difference is that we found a consistent unique effect of implicit attitudes 451 whereas they found a less consistent effect. Predicting votes for Mr. Obama The quadratic relationship between confidence and explicit prejudice was larger than the quadratic relationship between confidence and implicit prejudice.
